In this paper, we study severa,l general equilibrium models in whic.h the agents in a.rr economy muot decide on the appropriete level of immigration into the country. Immigration does not enter directly into the native agents'utility functions, and natives have identical preferences over consumption goods.
L Introduction
In this paper, we study several general equilibrium models in which the agents in an economy must decide on the appropriate ler.el of immigration into the coultry. I-mrnigration does not enter directly into the natire agents' utility functions, and natir"es have identical preferences over consumption goods. Howwer, natives may be end.owed with d.ifierent amoutrts of capital, which alone gives rise to alternative levels of desired immigration. We shoq/ that the natires' preferences over desired levels of immigration are influenced by the prospect that new irnrnigrants will be voting in the future, which may lea.d to higher taxation to fiItance goverrment spending from which they will benefit. We also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobilitS the distribution of initial capital among natives, the wea.lth or povertJr of the im.migra,rrt pool, and the future voting rights and eutitlements of immigrauts can all have a dramatic efiect on the equilibrium immigration and taxation policies.
Our analysis is novel in several respects. First and most importa.nt, the analysis inte$ates ihe political economy of inrmigration a.nd the political economy of taxatiol and government speuding, both of which have been examined sepaxately but not, to our knowledge, jointly. In many countries, discussions of the impact of inunigration focus almost e<clusir."ely on immigrants' consumption of publicly provided goods and sewices. Recently in the US, atteution ha-< turned as well to the role which naturalized citizens play in the determination of domestic election outcomes. One surprising result in our analysis is that the addition of immigrants who a"re both poorer than th€ native popr. a.tiotr and permitted to l'ote over redistribution does not necessaxily result in higher taxes and transfers. If initial weatth i::equaliw in the economy is low, the tax rate may artually /cll as immigrants axe admitted.
Secondly, our analysis eca.rnines the effect of immigration from the perspectire of natives' utfity levels, rather than income. In so doing, we also document why measures of the impact of immigration which focus solely on natives' income may be inappropriate. Such measures may be misleadhg because they ignore the efiects which the change il factor prices engendered by irnrnigration can have or natives' allocation of resources over time. Dependiag on the period sa"rnpled, natives'incomes may be inffeasing in the level of immigration, while their liletime utilities axe in fact falling as they are making intertemporal tradeoffs which they rould otherwise not. In this respect, the dynamic nature of our analysis is crucial-Finally, we study how the degree of international capital mobility a.ffects natives' preferences over the immigration and taxation issues-l This turns out to be impoftant-if inflors of labor are accompa.nied by substantial inflows of physical capital, the effect of immigration on factor prices and, ultimately, natives' utilities, is [kely to be smal]-We show that in the extreme, albeit unrealistic, case of perfect capital mobility, natives a,re in fart indifferent with respect to the level of immigration. In a world of less-thar-perfect capital mobilit5 ho*.erer, gmeral eqfibrium price effects arrd the effects of immigratior ou domestic fiscal poJicy rWe would like to thank the co-ediior for encouaaging us to puNue this issue, combine to give shaxp natile preferences over the level of immigratiou.
The importa.nce of immigration in the world economy is often under-appreciated. According to United Nations data, in 1990 there were 120 million 'foreign-born persons" in 214 countries. Tbis a.rnou:rts to 2-3 percent of the world's population, or a population that is roughly the size of Japan. This percentage of the world's population has stayed fowhly constant bt least since 1965.2 Immigration patterns difier radically across courtdes; The ftaction of the population that is "foreign-boru" ranges from 0.035% in Egypt to over 90% in the United Arab Emirates. Australia, Ca.nada, and the US, which account for only 5% of the world's population, have received three quaxters of the world's immigrants in the 1990's. Immigration accormts for 40% of the US population grollth rate.
There is also evidence that immigration is likely to become a much more important issue in the future. One reason is the secular decline in tra.nsportation costs that has permitted even unskilled workers to move great distanc$. But additionslly, the fall in fertility rates of industrialized countries implies that the popu.lation of ma,ny of these economies may become sznaller in the abseuce of immigration-For exa"rnple, there is currently not a single coruriry in Euope that has a fertility rate suficient to maintain its cu-rrent population in the long run, in the abseuce of immigration-Giren the agiug of the population of industdal countries, this has dire implications for the ability of these countries to maintain their current generous levels of gor,"ernmeutfunded social and retirement prograrx!-As Canada has already learned, increased immigratiou is one way to alleviate this financial er.igmcy.s
The intent of this paper is to shed some light on lhe economic factors which may il:Buence the voting patterns of domestic citizens on the issue of immigration. Additioually, we emphasize the dynamic aspects of this qrestion, $'hich would appea,r to be important. Altering imrnigration policy in one period will influence the quantity of the factors of production, factor prices and the distribution of income in future periods. If citizens then make subsequmt policy decisions, those decisions will be afiected as well by current immigration policy. If agents axe forward-looking, then they should take these future cotrsequences into Mcount when forrnulating preferencea o\,€r the number of immigrants to admit today.
There is some recent work that is related to the approach adopted below-Storeslettm [18] conducts an empirical analysis of the effect that immi$ation can hare on the fiscal position of the US federal government. Beuhabib [4] studies a simple model in which agents' motives are determined by purely economic considerations over alternative econonic policies, though the analysis does not contain many of the details zsee Maitin {141 for a comprehensive snalysh of immtration patterns. He describes much of the UN dats described here.
There is also monthly intemet newsletter titled the "MigratioD Nevrs" that reporis on world-wide immigrBtion issues. lt is availablc at httpr//migrstion.ucdavis.edu/mn/mntxt.htm.
sEberstadt [11] describes this data, which is forthcoming itr the United Nations volume etttilled Wodtl Poptlati.on Protpectu.
For exemple, in the post-unification Eastern Germany, the lertility rate is l€ss than one birth per woosn per liletirne. Slmilatly, Japan ha3 hod sub-replaceEeDt fertility for over 40 y€ars. studied in the model below. Cul<ierma,n, Hercowitz and Pines [8] also study inmigration, but they look at an environment in which the potential mi$ants mu6t make optimal decisions in consid€ring whether or not to mor€. Neither of these paperc considers the pot€ntial efiect, over several periods, on the quantities of both capital and labor, together with the changes i:r their factor prices, that result from the endogenous determination of the le.r.'el of immigratiotr, nor do they study how immigration can influence the future levels of gorerrunent spending or taxation through the outcome of the voting mecha,nism.4
There is also a subetantia.l body of empiricai work that seeks to measure the costs or benefits of immi- The remfider of this paper is organized as follor€. In the nort section, we describe the economic environment in tenns of the consumption and savings droices facing natives a"nd immigrants, the deterrnination of the supply of foreign-ovrned capital and the economy's aggregate production possibilities. In section 3, we turn to the political decisions which agents il the economy face, describing the nature and timing of these decisions and the method by which we construct the economy's equilibrium. Iu section 4, we analyze the behavior of the ecouomy mrmerically under eJternatia.e €ssumptions about the degree of inequality in natil€s' initial endowments of capital, the degree of iniernational capital mobility, the voti:rg rights and mtitlements of immigra^nts and the relative wealth or por€rty of the immigrant pool. We ofer some concluding remarks in section 5. An appmdk contairu a proof of a proposition given in section 4 and an a,nalysis of a special case in which the equilibriurn tax rate has a pa.rticu.la.rly simple closed-form expression.
The economic environment
We analyze an economy which lasts for thlee periods. There is no uncertainty, and agents ale assumed to have perfect foresight. We do not model irnmigrants' incentives to esigrete; rather, we asswne that there is an unlimited supply of identical potmtial inmigrants, relative to tbe initial size of the economy urder consideration. Immigrants, if admitted, arrive in the second period. They then must ma,ke optimal employment and saving decisions. In the second period, all agents in the economy who are en-ftanchised will rote orer the lerel of iucome taxation, and resulting redistribution, which will take place h the last period. In our benchmark case, immigra.nts a.rrive with only labor to supply and are enlranchised for voting in the second period. We also consider the cases where immigrants arrive with substantial capital, a.re not aThe efiect of immigration on factor prices should not be miniDaized. Marth I15] stBtes thst ls d pric€s in the US sre betweeE 10 and 20 percent higher because of the expected aroilability of immigrant workels. Given the strong political influence that some farm states car exhibit, thj.s can translate into a non-trivial efiect on actual policies. Borjas [6] and Card [7] certainly focus on factor prices in the labor market in their empirical analyses.
permitted to vote once admitted and are not entitled to transfers.
A novel feature of this model is that the policy adopted in period one, determining the amount of immigration, will i:rfluence the future distribution of ilcome a.rrd therefore the preferences of agents for future income taxation, which will be determined in the subsequent period. There is a sequential nature to the voting scherne d,nd if there is irnrnigration,-the median voter in one period will not, in geueral, be the median roter in a subsequent period, That is, agents in period one-the economy's natives-must cotrsider how their decision to admit immigrants will influence who will be the mediar voter over tax policy in period two. This is an iurportant ingredient which will enhance our understanding of the political mechanism which determines these policy parameters.
The decision problem of initial residents
We assume that there axe a continuum of initial residents, or 'natives', and the size of this population is normalized to unity-Natives in this economy face the most interesthg decision problem. Each uative is endowed with some amount of capital, tr, in the first period-The native divides this capital, an all-purpose good, into consumption in the first period and savings for the second period. In the second period, the natire receives his or her hcome ftom savings, aud income from labor services, which the native supplies inelastically. The labor endo*ments of all agents, both natives and immigra.nts, a,re norma.lized to one.
Income il period tqro is again divided between consumption and savings for period three. Also in period 2, the agenis vote on the level of taxation and transfers that a.re to be imposed ir the following period.
In the third and fi.nal period, agents simply consume their income, a.fter any taxes and transfers have been completed.
For computational pu.rposes, we assume that a lative agent's uti[ty over consumption in the three periods is described by the time-separable, logarithmic utility function Ios (cl) + B loc (c2) + f2los(cr).
(1)
All natives have the same preferences over the tb.ree conaumption goods. A native endowed initially with A1 units of cspital faces the following budget constraints for consumption in the three periods: cr I sz: kt, Qls3:r2s2as2, and ca : (1 -0) (r3s3 * t,:) + r, where s;11 denotes savhgs in period i, and 14 aud ry denote the period-i real wage rate and rental rate of capital, respectively. I is the income tax rate irr period three. We assume that the revenue which the government collects is rebated to agents in the economy in the form of a lumpsum transfer, r, which is identical across agents. The traasfer r might also be viewed as representing some sort of public good, or a tra,rnfer in kind that substitutes for pri\rate conflrmption.s We will say more below about the determination of the level of d and r.
2.2
The decision problem of immigrants lnmigra.nts a.re assruned to anive at the beginning of period two. For convenience, we denote the size of the i:nmigra"nt population as M. Since the size of the initial resident population is unity, the size of the total population during perlods two and three is then I * M = -L. As a benchmark, it is assumed that these agents hare no capital, but hare a single udt of labor-6 The preferences of immigrants are similar to those of residents over consumption in periods tno and three, and a,re giveu by tog (c2) + 0los(c:).
Immigra.nts must maximize utility subject to the following budget constraints c2+4:A2, aJlo ca : (1 -0) (res: + us) + z.
In the benchmark case where funmigrants arrive with only a unit of labor to supply, an immigrant's income in period two consists solely of wage income-i.e., y2 : 111r. If irnmigrants also have some amou.nt of capital kM , tben y2 : wz I rzkM .
2,3 Foreign capital
Not only ca.n immigrants erter this economy, but there may be international movements of physical capital as well-that is, inflows of immigra.uts may be accomparried by inflows of physical capital ftom abroad. This is what one would expect, if physical capital were perfectly mobile across countries, and if capital aad labor are complemeuts in the domeetic country. If rates of return on physical capital a,re initially equal across countries, then a movement of labor into the domestic economy, other things equal, will raise the retu.rn to cepital there relative to other countries.
owhat we have in rDind is that governmetrts sppea. obtigated to ofrer a certain amount of public services, even to newly arrived immigiants, These corld take ihe form of r,'clfare or income-subsidy paymetrts, but also subsidies for education or health-care, or non-excludable goods suc,h as roads or parks. This certainly s€emed to be a pertinent area of cotrcertr for msny people itr California in recent discussions about immigration policies. 6That the immigrants ar€ relatively poor js a very plausible benchmark, Martin [14] describes the "typicsl" rmmtgrant around the world as someone who is young, st or near the bottom of the emigration country's job ladder, aud often ftom rural Aleaa. We srill consider below the case where immigrants are relatively ch.
To ma,ke this aspect of the model as simple as possible, we assume that foreign agents a.re risk-neutral inrcstors who face a cost of adjusting their capital holdings in the domestic economy. Precisely, foreign agents have linear utility or€r consurnption in all tbree periods, with discount factor B. Given some initial amourrt of capital located in the domestic economy, call it Kfl, they choose ralues of Kf and If to maximize ql1czlEzcz subject to q: F$f -K{i,t (K!,K*).
Here, fi represents the period-i return to capitat located in the domestic economy, net of any taxes-in particular, iz : rz and fu : (7 -0) ry. Note that the return to foreign capital invested b the domestic economy i:r the third period is also taxed at the rate d. The cost of adjustment is captured U+ I (rc{,Xfrr), which we assume to have the quadratic form -t (K{,K{+,): }Wr -K,1,)'.
Utility maxiuization by foreign agents gives rise to the followi:rg simple rule governing the evolution of foreigu-ovrned capital located in the domestic economy: This decision rule implies thet the higher is the net-of-tax domestic rate of return to capital, relative to 1/p, the laxger will be the inflow of foreign capital. llere, .^ 2 0 represents an adju8tment co6t para.meter that influmces the desired change in the capital stock; the smaller is ), the larger will be the response ir foreign capital to s charge in the domestic uet rate of return to capital. At one extreme, if ) : 0, then there are no adjustment costs, which implies that there is perfect capital mobility between economies. In this case, equilibrium requires that the a.fter-tax domestic returns to capital in each period obey i;+t : 7/F. In equilibrium, the factor prices r; and ru; will obey the marginsJ con.ditions 
3 Immigrafion and
3.L The timing of decisions
Immigration policy, which is here simply the number M of immigrants to admit, is decided in the first period, prior to the trati!€ residents' consumption-savings decision. Redistributir"e fiscal policy, sunmarized by the tax parameter d, is determined in the second period, also prior to agents' consumption-savings decisions. To describe the political equilibrium, we use the sta.ndard model of two-party competition, though in this case there is a sequence of elections, earh over a single issue.g
Our choice of a sequential ftamework is prirua,rily motivated by our interest in what happeus when, through irrunigration, the size of the voting population and the distribution of income among voters, change.
It would be inappropriate to study this in a framework with a single first-period election ol'er both M and 0, in which, necessa,rily, only natives would pa.rticipate. By the sarne toket, a seEuence of electiom in which both of lhe issues are decided-say, for o<ample, iI natives vote on a level immigration a.nd taxation to be implemented in period two, and then natives and newly-a,rrived immigrants vote over fiuther i$migration and taxation for period three-would seem to detract from the main mechanisms at work, as well as rendering 8In our experiments below, rre co4sider a ca3€ where immigra[ts arrive iE period two bringitrg a quantity of capital ,f4f, in whidr case aggrcgate capital in pe od two becomes K2: l(rD 4 K{ + Ky -9A more complete description of the underlying twc.party competition is give[ in the tecbdcal appcndix, which i6 al'ailable on rcquest from the authoru. the analysis hopelessly complicated. Proving the e<istence of, and ca.lculatilg, a majority-rule equilibriumr0 in a single election with a two-dimensional issue space is diftcult even in more idealized settings, let alone irr a model with as many equilibrium interactions as are present here.11
The issue in tbe fust round of voting is the number of immigra.nts to admit. We will consider the ca.se where the issue space is a closed interval ftom zero tosome maximum rumber of immigrants. Even though natir"es have identical preferences over consunptior goods, if they difier in theh idtial capital holdings they will in general rlot have identical preferences over the number of immigrants to admit. We let p, denote the distribution of initial capital in the native population with support over some set rc c R+. The size of the resident population is normalized to one, so tlLat IKh(dA1):1.
Once the number of immigrants to be admitt€d has been decided, natives ma&e their consumption and saving decisions. In the second period, the irnmigrants arrir,e, production tal<es place, and agents receive their second-period incomes, which they will divide between second-period coDsumption and savings for the third peiod.
Pzior to this second consurrrption-savings decision, however, agents vote on the size of the income tax rate 0 to be implemented in the subsequmt period.i2 Given gor,ernment budget balance snd equilibrium consideratioru, the choice of g implies a choice of trar$fer z. If immigrants a.re enfranchised, then the set of participants in this second round of voting consists of atl 1 + ,'l,f agents irr the economy; otherwise, the set of paxticipants is the same as in the fust round of voting-i-e., the native population. Since there is no uncertainty the walues of r and d are hown at the beginrdDg of period two-As will be seeu, these parameters are endogenously determined as functions of other structural features of the economy. in a mallner that we describe in the next section.
The model from period two on
In order to describe the economy's equilibrium, we work backwa.rds from the fi.al period to the first. Because of the economy's recursive structure, we are able to sohc for the eqfibrium outcome in the last period-in terms of prices, quantities, a.nd fiscal polcy variables---<onditional on a value of M and a distribution of income at the start of the second period. trhll equilibrium for a gir.en mlue of M--described in the subsequent section-is then had by stepping back to period one to consider the economic decisions which determine the distribution of income in the second oeriod.
roFor exarrple, by verifying Plott's I1?] condition. rr It is also worth Pointing out that,, €ven if one wished to consider altemative political mechanisms by which policies sre s€i, we believe that much ofour analysis is still useful. Clearly, an esscntial datarn to alry politico-economic snslysis of immigration policy is a descdption of ratives' preferences over iBlrigratio[. A large part of the analysis below is siEply an attrempr ro understand, ftom general equilibrium considerations, whete lratii,es' preferences over immigration colne from.
12 More precisely! in terms ofthe undetlyitrg two-party competition, there is a second round of elections in whici the caudrdates espouse platforms with l$pect to 0.
In this section, then, we corxider a model where irunigrants, having a.rrived, vote together with residmts over redistributive fiscal policy at the beginning of period two. The size of the population or workforce for these two periods 'E L : 7 + M, where M is taken as giren.
Consider a,rr individual, who may be either an immigrant or a native agent, who has income in period two equal to 92. Such s,rr individual faces the followirg optimization problem max {log(cz) + ploC(ca)} subject to ihe budget constraints given by
It is easily seen that the solution to this problem is a decision rule of the form (5) (6) (7) (8) where @ : I-z + r/ (te)I /r". Moreover, substitution of the decision rule and constraints into the agent's utility firnction gives a.n ercpression for the agent's maximized utility ftom period two on in terrns of the agetrt's income, 92, the after-tax return to saving, (1 -9) 13, and iD-
(e) If p2 (.) denotes the distribution of period-two income across all agents in the economy (i-e. new rmmrgrants and previous resideuts), then aggregate domestic saving for period tbree is given lry:
r : 0 (rzKz t 4Ll / L : e ("+ + -").
-ltuz-al :"1r+p I, where 92 denotes the average level of period-two income. Aggregate capital for period three, I{3, is thm the sum of Kfl and Kf, where the latter is givm by equation (2), i.e., x{:x{ +s-t(B(-o)rs-1).
We assume that the government rebates all proceeds from the period-three income tax to ageuts in the ecotrouy via the transfer payment z, which is identical across agents. Thus, 10
With our Cobb-Douglas tecbrology, the wage-rental ratio is given by
Using this, a.nd the previous expression for 7, a little algebra rcveaJs that
Substituting (f3) into (10), z dry:aA(K3/.1)"-1 into (11) 
subject to (10), (11) and (13) For the economy we consider here, agents' implied prefermces over d are well-behaved; numerical evaluation reveals them to be single'peaked, with preferred lalues of d wea^kly decreasing in the agent's income gr2-that is, agetrts with higher period-tro incomes prefur lower va.lues of the tax rate-As we show in the appendix, sectioq 6.2 below, in the special case where there is no foreign capital arrd the third-period prc duction tecbnology is linear in capital (i.e. a : 1), one can actually obtain a simple cloced-form solution for a.ny agent's preferred tax rate.
Since the couditions of the median voter theorem apply, we set the equilibrium third-period tsx rate equal to the preferred ralue of the agent with the median level of period-two income.l4 This implies that the behavior of the economy in period three-equilibrium prices a.nd qua,ntities and fiscal policy----ca,a be described in terms of three variables, the mean and media.n of the period-two income distribution a"nd the level of irn"nigration. Moreoler, the utility from period two onwa,rd of any agent ca,:r be described in terms of those thee variables, together with the agent's or.r pedod-two income. Let u(y2;y2,gi,ll4) denote this indirect utility firnction for an agent who has period-two income equal to U2. Herc, gfl denotes the median Ievel of period-two income. This u is simply the indirect utility frrnction (9), with iD, 0 a,rrd 13 set equal to their equilibrium walues, which in turn depend on the list of aggregate statistics ?2, yi alld, M.
13In fact, given the linea ty of egents' savings rulee, l("D depende on the distribution p2 only through its mean, 92. L€ss ditectly, I{, as gir.en in (11) 
The fuIl three-period model with redistributive taxation
In the last section we have described the optimization problem faced by immigrants and natives over the Iast two periods for given lerrels of period-two income, and the resulting eqtilibri"m for a givm distribution of period-two income a.nd ler.rcl of immigration. We now step bark to period one and show how the distribution of income in period two can be determined, giren the lerel of irnmigration M. In the end, we will have described the full equilibrium of the economy for a giren value of ,'lf. Using that information, we can then turn to consider natives' Iifetime utilities ir terms of M.
First, note that the period-two income of a native agent is the sr.un of capital a^nd labor incoue, and can therelore be written as
For an imiglant, either 3r2 : u2 or y2 : rzkM *'ruz, depmding on whether or tot immigrants a,rrire with some capital,
The aggregate stock of capital in period two will be the sum of aggregate domestic savings from period one, foreign capital located in the domestic economy and, possibly, capital brought by immigrants. The latter, when present, is simply given by MkM, if M immigra.nts axe admitted and each owns ftM units of capital-Foreign capital employed in the domestic economy in period two is gir"en by the i :2 version of (2), K{=K{+}@"2-r).
The interesting problem is again faced by natives, who must make a consumption-sa.vings decision in period one, given the level of immigration M and expectations about the distribution of income which will prevail in period two. We may cast a typical native's decision problern as max log (h1 -s2) + Ba (r2s2 + uz;az,AT, M) .
Given the form of the indircct utility fi.rrction o-it is logaritbmic in y2 + iD-utility maximization again gives rise to a savings rule which is Iinear ir income-In pa.rticular, s2 (h1; w2,r2,y2,yi, M) :
where O is as defined in (13) (16) P(L+0h-(w+o)lr2 (17) where k1 is the ar€rage initial capital holding among natives.
Aggregate capital in period two is then K2 : KP + K{ * Kjw, where K{ : Ml"M ia the case where immigrants each bring frM > 0 units of capital-In either case, by substitut iutg w2 : (la) A (K2 / L)" a.nd 12: aA(K2/L)'-L into the previous expressioas for K2D aud Kf, the equilibrium condition K2 :
Kl + K{ + Ky beccimes dn equatiori .rhich can be solved for K2 given tr and O. This is the capital stock il period two for a given lerel of immigration (embodied in -L) and a given distribution of period-t$'o income (captured in @).
For a given ralue of M, then, the first-period savings decision of natives depends on a conjecture about the period-two distribution of income, since this determines the outcome in period tbree. Clearly, the natires' decisions m hnply a distribution of income in period tpo. The economy is in equilibrium when the conjectured and realized distributions coincide. More precisely, the conditiom that chaxa.cterrze an eqfibrium for this economy in our benchma,rk case can be summarized as follows.
Given the following initial conditions for the fust period, p1 (.),K{,L, an equilibrium is then a list IKilK?,K{,Ky,wa,ra,yf ,U2,0,r}, for I : 1,2, and a distribution of capital pr2 (.), such that the fotlowing conditions hold:
1. Agents' consumptiotr-savings decisions follow the rules (8) and (16).
2-Factor prices for each period. are given by equations (3) 6. The variable Q in equations (8), (10), (14), (16) and (17) is as defined in (13) .
Having described how the economy's equi.librium is constructed for a paxticular given va.lue of L : l* M,
we will now turn to study the preferences of native agents over different le\.€ls of immigration. By substituting equilibrirrrn prices, taxes and transfers at each ralue of M, together with agents' optimal decision rules, back into the ageuts' lifetime utility firnctions, we can study how an individual's iifetime utility over all three periods ranies as a futction of the level of immigration, M.
The actual construction of arr equfibrium is somewhat involved, as one might gather from the discussion above. This is due to the depeudence of the third-period outcome-including the gor.ernmeut policy va.riables d and r----on the endogenous distribution of income in the second period, which in turn conditioDs agents' decisions in the first period. In equilibrium, prices and quantities must be such that the optimal choices which individual agerts make at larious dates are consistmt y,rith the Laws of motion of the aggregate 'rariables.
Because ofthe model's complocity, analytical results axe difrcult to obtain outside ofa few special casese.9., the case of perfect capital mobiliiy, which we examine below. Consequently, in the following sectiou we We also assume throughout that natives' initial capital holding" (frr) hare a log-normal distribution which is tra.nslated away from the origin to guara.rntee that all natives begiu with some arnount of capital. We limit our attetrtiotr here to log-normal distributions, as these seem to provide a reasonable approximation to ob.
sen€d distributions of wealth while retaining substantial computatioral tractability. For all our er<periments, we fix the average initial capital holding at l0 u:rits a.nd the midmum initial capital holding at 2 units of capital-For our benchma.rk case, the rralia.nce of the distribution is set to gil€ a Gini coefficient of rougbly 0.37, which is close to measures of the Gini coeff.cieut for the distribution of income in the US.17 l6Els€where [9] we have studied the influence which the preference and production psraneters p aud a caa have on tbe prefered level of immigration. r? We harr alao examired models with e number of different dist butions for rativ€s' irdtial wealth. (See {9]).
is norma.lized to one, lalues of M are s,'non''mous with numbers of immigrants as a ftaction of the native population-Pa,nel A shows the behavior of third-period tax rate as we vary M. For this economy, the tax rate rises smoothly as the number of immigrants a.dmitted increases. If the figure were extended rightward, the tar rate wor-rld eveutually rise to e maximum of roughly 31%. While it is perhaps intuitir,e that the addition of agents who are both poor and permitted to vote should lead to higher redistributive taxation, this is not inevitable and depends to a large extent on the shape of the initial distribution of capital. As we show below, for log-normal distributions of initial capital vrith low degrees of inequality, it is possible for the equilibrium tax rate to fa.ll as immigrants are added to the ecoromy-even falling to zero-despite the fact that imrrigrants are poorcr thaJx the ar,erage native and enfrarchised to vote.
The ecplanation for the behavior of the tax rate itl the case at hand lies in the plot irn:nediaiely below, Panel C. Panel C shoq,s the behavior of three different income measrues in the second period-The va.riables relere.nt for the det€rmination of the taJC rate ale med,ian second-period income and aueru4e second-period income. Rccall that when all agents-both natives a"nd immigrants-are allowed to vote oa€r tax policy, then in equilibrium the third-period tax rate is set at the walue preferred by the individual with the median level of income in period tro-Ilowever, as in other political-ecouomic models of redistribution, the actual value of the tax chosen by the media.n income recipient depends on th€ ratio of that individual's income to a'uerage income.rE As immigrants are added to this economy, each immigrant coming with only labor to supply, both median and arerage second-period income fall, and in this case media.n second-period income falls faster than ar'erage second-period inmme. Consequeutly, the gap between median and average secoud-period income $ows, rcsulting in a,rt itrcreasing tsx rate.
With a log-normal distribution of initial capital and very low i::itia.l wealth inequality, it is possible for median second-period income to fall more slotulg than arerage second-period income, resr.rlting in tax rates which decline with the mrmber of irnmigrants. In some cases, the tax rate may then begin to rise after the level of immigration reaches a critical level; in other cases, the tax rate can actually fall to zero and remaia there until immigrants outnumber natives-lg
The behavior of fartor prices-the returns to labor and capital in periods two and three----ca.n be deduced from Psnel E, which plots the capital-labor ratios in each of the tq,'o periods, as functions of the level of immigration.
In both period two and period three, the capital-labor ratio falls as M is increased. The 18This feature is common to a number of different economies (See PeNson aDd Tabellini [f6]). See Dolmas and lIufiman [10] for e derivation of thfu featurc in s much more epecialized environment. lgThis is api to happen ss well when the distributioo of initial capital holdings is coDrposed of a flnite number of types {e.9-, tiro typ€s of native-sr rich rrBtives with capital 'i' and poor natives vrith capitat &P), or il there is a large mass of natives who hold the media,tr quantity. What all thcse cases heve in common tu thst a lsrge influx of immigrants leads to only a small decrease, ot no decresse st all, in the initial capital holdiDg which identifies the median ageDt in period two. The preferences of the media.n native-the native with the media.n holdiag of initial capital-are shown ir Panel D. For this distribution of initial wealth, the media.n uative is poorer thaJr average, though not greatly so-the median native's initial capital holding is about 68% of the al€rage initial capital holrling.
Still, the median is relia"nt on labor income to a suficient fitent that his or her utility falls as M increases.
Were the figure extended rightwa.rd, though, this decline would begin to 'bottom out' a,round M : .50, or au influx of immigrants equal to 50% the size of the native population. Nonetheless, over the interval 0 to .25, the media.n's preferred 1"ysl 6f lmmigration is zero.20
Note, too) that while the median natire's lifetime utility is falling, his or her second-period income*-shor rr in Panel C-is rising. The sa.me is true of the median uative's third-period income as well. As the iaflow of immigrants reduces the value of the natire's labor endowrnent and increases the return to saving, this native sal€s more for the future-arrd consumes less in the first period-than he or she would have chosen to in the absence of immigration. This example illustrates why it would be inappropriate to mea.sure the effect of immigration on the native population merely by how their incomes drange--particula.rly their labor income.
20A generel feeture of th€ closed version of the economy studied here is that so long as s nstile is eadowed with sorDe amount of capital, howe!.er small, there is a level of immigratio[, sufrciently large, which thst native will prefer to zero iDrmigration.
If a large enough quantity of complementsry labor is added to the economy, the increase in the value of even s poor trative's cspitAl will eventually ofiset the decline iD the value of that nsiive's labor eDdowment. RealGtically, though, before that poi lower degree of initial wealth inequality-a Gini of 0.251-the tax rate at zero immigration is roughly half its correspondilg value in the benchma"rk economy. With lower initial wealth inequality, the resulting degree of iuequality in second-pe.riod incomes is also lower, hence the gap between media.n and average second-period incomes smaller, and so the impetus for redistribution tempered. As in the benchma.rk case, the tax rate in the 0.25-Gini ecouomy rises with the lel€l of immigration, though more slowly. At a more extreme degree of low inequality-a Gini of 0.10-ihe tax rate actually decli,rns as imruigrants a.re added to the economy, falling quickly to zero near M : -lO-In this case, arerage ilcome in period two initially falls more sharply with the increase in M than median income in pedod two, to the poi:rt where-near M = .10-a\,'erage income falls belovr median income, and the period-tno medisJr voter prefers a zero tax rate.
With a higher degree of inequality the tax rate is high because the relativek poor median roters in period two aote to e)dract income ftom the richer agents, irrespective of the size of the immigrad population. With enough initial wealth inequaiity-in this case a Gini coefficient of 0.50-the median of the initial capital distribution is so far below the mean that natives at or beloy/ the media.n do not have positive savings for period two, so the median roter over tax poliry is an agent with only labor income rega.rdless ofthe level of irnrnigtation. The preferred income tax rate for such an individuat is roughly 31%.22
2r In these experiments, we hold constsnt the meen initial cspital holding and the midmum initial capital holditrg 22In this case, at all lBlues of M the rstio of median to sverage second-period income is simply labor'6 share of trational income, or 1o. In this case, raisiDg the ta"x rate even higher does not rabe the wage of labor in the ldst pcriod because it deters investment in caDitsl-L7 Pa^nel B of Figure 2 illustrates how the preferences of the media.n native cha.nge as the degree of initial wealth inequality rhanges. Since we a,re holding fixed average initial capital, the initial capital level held by the media.n native fa.lls as the degree of irequality increases. Consequently, to facilitate compa,rability we have norma.lized the median natir"e's utility by a constant so that the media.n's utility in each case is zero at zero immigration. The important feature of Panel B is that, as the degree of iaitial wealth iaequality 'ranies from high inequa"lity to low inequality, the median native's distaste for immigration lessens, and is irr fact rer"ersed-when the initial wea.lth distribution is characterized by a Gini coefrcient of 0.10, the median natire prefers the maximum level of immigration to zero irnmigration.2s
Since any natire with initial capital at l€ast es great as the media^n a.lso prefers M --.25 to M : 0, at least 50% of the natives in the low-iuequality economy prefer the maximum level of irnmigration. If we compa.re the behavior of this Iow-inequality economy with the otherwise ideqtical beuchmark economy, the two will have sharply different politieeconomic equilibria-M : 0 and a roughly 21% tax rate in the bencbmark economy uersus M : .25 a,nd a zero tax rate in the low-inequality economy.
The basic mecha"niem at work here is the following. For a fixed average initial endowment of capital, a higher degree of inequality translates into a lower median level of initial capital, relative to arerage. This has the efiect of making the nedian native more reliant or his or her labor income in periods two and tb.ree, hence mote averse to iumigration. The opposite is true as the de$ee of inequality is reduced.2a
Ceteris paribus, then, we would expect economies with lower degrees of wealth inequality to be more open to ineigration. Some evidence in faror of this result is shoq/:r in Figure 3 , which illustrates the relationship between the quantity of loug term immigration, as a fraction of total population, and the level of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefrcient.2s There is a significant Degative correlatiou betweeu these two r,ariables, as predicted by the model.26
t3The sarne patter[ arises if we instead hold fixed ihe median level of initial weslth aDd allorr the mean to change as the degree of incquality changes. 24It is worth noting that there js nothing special in this example atlout the los-normal distribution of iritisl cspitat-The effects which chsnges in inequaliiy can have on the rcsults are robust to sll distdbutions that we have snslyzed, See Dol$as and llutrman [9] . 25The Gini coelficients are derived from a data set published by the World BaDk. The data on long term immigrants is hom the United Nations [19] . We look at long term imDrigrants to avoid other florr/s such as tourists. Obviously these must then be normalized by population to sdjust for country size. 18 
The effects of capital mobility
In this section, we examine the consequences which international capital mobiliff can harre for the behavior of this economy.
Perfect capital motrility
The model is suficiently rich that it is difficult to obtain many conclusive a.nalltic results. One enception is the case where there is perfect capital mobfity, the case where the adjustmetri cost paxameter .tr is equal to zero. The results can be summa,rized by the following proposition:
Proposition L Il A:0, then 0 :0, and this is the preferyed ta.x mte of all citizetu aoting in the serond period,. We then hate that 12 : rt -!/F and w2 : ta3 : (1a)A(aBA)ria, all ind.epend,ent oJ M.
Consequently, aII iwitial natiues are ind,ifierent about the leael of imrnzgtntion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This result holds independent of the tratue of the initial distribution of capita^I, and indepeudent of th€ parameter rslues used for prefereuces a,rrd techrology. The reason for this is fairly intuitive. With no adjustment cost, the supply of foreign physical capital is perfectly elastic at the time preference rate 1/8, so equilibrium demands that 12 and (1d)r3 eqaf 1/8. With ihe after-tax return to capital in period-three thus fixed, labor bea.rs the full incidence of any tax imposed, and so, in a sense, redistribution is pointless. All agents thus prefer 0:0, implying r:0 as well. With 12 :7r : 1/F and our constant-returns technology, the capital-labor ra.tios in periods two and three are fxed independent of M, as a,re the returns to labor ra2 and ra3. Since immigants then impose no msts on rcsidents-nor do they confer any benefits-the ecoromy's natir€s are indifrerent about the lei,el of irnmigration. In this case, iu effect, each additional immigrant is accompanied by precisely enough physical capital to 'correct' the depressing effect which the immigrant has oa natir"e wages and the positive effect which the imrnigra.nt has on the return to capital.
Presumably this result u,ould change if there were some direct costs to immigration (e.9. congestlon costs or perhaps admidstrati!€ costs associated with processing the uew immigrants) wbich were borne by the initial residents. The result would a.lso change if the production tech.nology w€re not constant-returns-to-scale in capital and labor, or if a nou-reproducible factor such a,s lend werc present.
Limited capital mobility
What happens when there is less-tha.n-perfect capital mobility? In this section, we compare the results from our benchmark case where capital is immobile () = +m) with results for economies with some degree of capital mobility-For the cases with some degree of mobility we consider .\ : 0. is quite clos€ to the behsvior of the ecoEomy with no c$pital mobility at all (l : +oo).
we will not illu,strate this in detail, as .\ approaches zero, all the results approach the ones described above for the case of perfect capital mobility. Figure 4 illustrates the effects of alternatire levels of capital mobility. Panel A shows the behavior of the third-period tax rate, which both declines at each ralue of M as capital mobility increases and becomes less responsil€ to charxged in 'M the greater'degree of capital mobility. Of course, the tax rate must ultimately fa]l to z€ro at all r'alues of M as ) ---+ 0.
In general, the effect of capital mobility on the equilibrium tax rate is comploc-i-n particular, the presenc€ of foreign physical capital complica.tes the dhect liuk betwem the level of the tax rate and the ratio of second-period rnedia.u to average income which obtains in the closed economy case. The effects of changing the degree of capital mobility are occasionally non-monotonic as v€ll. In a number of economies we e:<a.rnined, as we increased the degee of capital mobitity (i.e., lowered the mlue of ,\ from A : *oo), economies which started with very low tax rates over the interval of M-rnlues experienced-idtially-higher ta)< rates at som€ or all values of M, before the taxes €ventually fell again.
The preferences of the median voter over the level of immigration, shovu in Panel B of the figu-re, arc always decreasing ir the level of immigration. Hoqever, they a,re decreasing much less sharply the geater the degree of foreign capital mobility-i. e-, the smaller is ,\. This is what one would expect, given that in the limit, as ) -+ Q, we must approach indifference over the lalue of M for all natives in the economy.
In other words, the median native dislikes irnmigration, but the effects of immigration can be arneliorated subsiantially by the importation of capital.
This result suggests that goa€rnments may be able to curtail opposition to immigration by also adopiing policies to attract capital. In our model economy, the capitallabor ratios in both production periods, at eaclr ler"el of M, are higher with greater capital mobility tha"n with less mobility. Consequently, the effects of immigration on factor prices are less pronouaced the greatex the de$ee of capital mobility. As a rcsult, capital-poor uatives suffer less ftom i:nmigration when thexe is greater international mobility of physical capital.2s
Our model would imply that if capital were mobile, then countries that were to have plenty of immigration v/ou-ld also be importing capital. We have found a significant positive correlation betn'een the size of a country's foreign-bom population, and the level of net foreign direct in'estment. Additionally, there is ample anecdotal evidence on this poini. Until recentlg the economi€s of both Singapore and Malaysia had been growing at approrcimately 9% per year for a sustained period of time, primarily by importing la,rge quantities of both labor a.nd capital.2e Ma,rtin [14] states that in the early 1990s nea;rly 7% of the GDP in Malaysia was attributable to foreign direct investment. Our oru calculatioff] reveal arr even higher mrmber 28Though, of course, capital-rich natives beDefit less from immigration as well. 29See Martin I14]. As much as 70% of the jobs iD the construetion sector in Malaysia ai€ taken up by foreign workers.
for Singapore in tle 1980s. tr\rthermore, it is well-knovrn that there have been large amounts of both Asian capital a,nd labor imported into the Vancouver region of Ca.nada over the past 10-15 years, with a concomitant esca,lation in real estate prices.
Alternative assumptions on irnmigrants' voting rights, endowments and entitlements
In the experiments of this section, we consider the effects of different assumptions about immigrants' voting rights, their wealth or poverty upon arriviug, aud their entitlement to govemmeDt transfer payments. Each of these cases has some relevance from an empirical public policy standpoint. In most coutrtries, 'r'oting righk axe grarted to irnYnigrants only as the culmination of a lengthy process of naturalization. Sone cormtries as well have adopted policies which attempt to alter the compo€ition of their Lnmigant in-flows in ways which favor inmigrarts y'ith lsrge a,rnolurts of capital.s0 Finally, the view that irnmigrants represent a drain on public services such as welfare and education, and perhaps ought to be excluded from these services, is prelzlent ia policy debates orer immigration both in the US aud elsewhere.
In earh of the er<anples below, we report two sets of resu.lts, one for the closed-ecoromy case of no capital mobility (.\: +co) ad one for the case of limited capital mobility () =.10). The resu.lts for all of the experiments arc contained in the panels of Figure 5 .
Disenfranchised immigrants
First of all, we compare the behavior of our benchma,rk economy to one in which ifirmigra[ts axe not permitted to vote over fiscal policy, but still pay the tax a.ud receive the tra.::sfer r. The key feature of this regime is that the median voter over tax policy in period two is the median native rega.rdless of the level of imnigration allowed ln period one.
The top two panels of Figure 5 show the behavior of the third-period tax rate and the preferences of the median native when the economy is closed to foreign capitaf (.\ : +oo). In this case, as indicated by the 'A' symbol, when immi$arts a.re disenfta.nchised, the third-period tax rate fa.Us as immigants a.re added. If irnmigrfits are not permitted to vote in the second period, the population voting wer ta,:< policy for period three consiats solely of uatives, and the ta,x rate is set according to the preferences of the natire with the median lerel of initial capital-In this case, the second-period inmme of the media,n native is increashg in 2r is slightly higher, but this individual-ard the 50% of the nati\,e population with lower iDitial endowm€nts of capital-would still opt for M : 0 even if immigrants a,re disenfranchised.
In economies with lorrer degrees of initial wealth inequality, where the mediaJx trati!€ is wealthier, it is possible for the disenftanchisement of immigra.nts to alter the equilibrium immigration outcome. When the median native is wealthier, the coutrteri?iling factor price effects of irn:nigration on his or her utility are more ofi-setting, making the fiscal consequences of immigration more important.
When we allow for limited capital mobility, the third-period tax rate--{hose,n by the median native when immigrants a.re disenftanchised-is no longer decreasing in M, but is stil1 considerably lov/er st positiv€ values of M than it would be were immigra.nts permitted to vote. The preferences of the mediar native in the liynited-capital-mobility case, shown in Panel D, are e!€n more similar across the two enfranchisement regimes than ir the closed economy case shovrn in Panel B. This is to be orpected, as inflows of foreigt capital dampen the changes in factor prices engmdered by immigratiou. As in the closed economy case, the median natirc here prefers M : 0 regardless of whether immigrants are permitted or barred ftom voting over redistribution-Rega.rdless of whether there is no capital mobility or limited capital mobility, the preference for high immigration of wealthier natives (not shown) is significantly stronger when immi$alrts are not permitted to vote, du€ to the lower taxes whidr result when immigrants are disenfta.nchised.
Wealthy immigrants
We aow suppoee that immigrants, rather than being endowed with only labor to supply-hence coming in at the bottom of the secoud-period income distribution-are endowed with capital as well. In pa.rticula.r, we consider a case where earh immigrant a.rrives with ar amount of capital which would place the.m at the cut-ofi for the top 20% of the initial distribution of capital among natires-3r
We fust consider the closed-economy case. Panel A of Figrue $ qgqin sh6rr,E the behavior of the tax rate for the ).: +m case. Th€ tax rate when immigrants arrive wealthy is shovrn by the'O'line in the panel.
R.elatiw to the benchmark economy (sho*'n by the 'Q' line), the tal< rate at all positive values of M is slightly higher when immigrants axrive with capital, and is still increasing in the Ievel of irnmigration. When immigrants come with substantial wealth, the initial capital-holding identifying the second-period median voter uow nses with M. While the increasing wealth lerzel a.ud second-period income of the median lnotetr would seem, other things equal, to lead to decreasing tax rate6, auerage pe,riod-two income-whidr can be viewed as a measure of the ta>c base-is increasing ewn more sharply-Hence the equilibrium tax rate is still increasins as a function of M-SlThis is especially inter€sting given the appare[t difierenc€s in the immigrstion policies of Canada aud the US. The US, until very recently, seems to have given litile consideration to th€ skills or wealth levels of immigranta, whereas Cansda giv€3 these factoN substaniial weight, and ha.s tleen cdticized for selling citizeDship.
While the fiscal consequeuces of immigrants' wea.lth seem small, whether immigrants are poor or wealthy does male a great deal of difference for the preferences over immigration of the median native. When im.uigrarts are wealthy and capital is immobile, the median native now prefers the maximum level of immigration. While we do oot show the preferences of other agents in the econouy, il' this case all natives poorer than the median also prefer the maximum level of irrnigration, as immigra"nts now raise, rather tha,rr lower, the return to labor. Of course, coming with capital, immigra.nts also lower the return to capital in the economy, which harms the natives at the upper end of the initial capital distribution. 
Immigrants without entitlements
Another experiment that is of interest is to investigate what happens when i:mmigrants, who have no initial capital) catr enter the economy and must pay taxes, but do not get to vote, and do not get the resulting transfer (r). This if of interest since many people seem to view the problem with imsigration to be that the immigrants will subsequently become a drain on public services such as weLfa,re or education-The uodel indicates that in this instance appaxently all initial residents favor the ma:rimum level immigration. The reason is simple trativEs now view the immigrants as a tax base that cam be exploited and which does not receive its shaxe of the transfer. Because of this, the residents, despite being relatil€ly rich, now faror rnuch higher leuek of ttnation so that they can exploit this immigrant population.
The tax consequences of this modification are apparent from Panels A and C. When immigrants are disen-fta.nchised and barred from receiving the trarsfer, a.uy lerrl of immigration decided in period one leads to shaxply highex taxes as compa.red with the benchmark economy. The cases of no capital roobility and limited capital mobility a"re distinguished only by the somewhat lorer tax rates wtrich obtain wben capital is mobile-rougbly 35% whm M : .25 n the ): .10 case r€rflxi over 50% when M = .25 in the.\: -l-oo case.
As Panels B and D show, the median native has a strong preference fot M : .25 in this case, regardless of whether capital is immobile or mobile. WJriIe we do not report the prefetences of other natil'es, we find that all natires share the median natiye's preference in this case-the poorer natives in spite of the lolver 23 wages which result arrd the pealthier latives fur spite of the higher taxes which result.
Final R emarks
The model that we have constructed and studied is unique in that it attempts to explore both the general equilibrium factors that can influmce an economy's ilnmigration policy decision, as well as the effects a,rising from the interaction of imrnigration and the determination of other domestic policies-in particula.r, how the immi$ation decision will in-fluence the futu-re disiribution of income in the economy, and therefore how lhis w1JJ. infiuence future f,scal policies. The preferences of natives orer the quantity of immigration talte into accouat both of these sets of consequences. Immigratiotr in one period will a"fiect factor prices in subsequent periods in ways that benefit the relatively capital-rich a^nd ha,rm the relatir.ely capital-poor, if immigrants a.re themselves capital-poor, When immigra,nts a,re enfranchised to vote over subsequent fscal policy, the model implies that rati\€s must ta.ke into consideration how the lerel of immigration in the curent period affects the identity of the median voter over subsequmt redistributive taxes and transfers.
I.r this paper we have studied an er-tremely streqrnlined model in which ageuts c€n lete on one redistributive policy pa.rameter, the tsx rate 0, which ultimately determines the level of the tra.rsfer r. In reality, there a,re a plethora of government policy lra,riables and prograrftI that carr be us€d to tra,nsfer capital from one group of people to others.
Our model also shows how native residents' preferences over the qua.ntity of imuigration a"re i:rfluenced by various factors, i:rcluding the degree of dornestic income or wealth inequality and the degree of international capital mobility.
Other things equal, increased inequality h the native population leads the median native to be less likely to prefer high levels of immigration, because vrith higher inequality in the initial distribution of capital, the median natire is an individual more reliant oa labor income, hence more smsiti!€ to the adverse effects qrhich irnrnigration has ou the return to Labor. At higher degrees of initiel nati!€ inequality, irDmi$ation leads to higher taxes behg chosen by the subsequent median l'oter who, because of the high inequa.lity, will be relatively poor. As initial weelth inequality shrinks, poorer natiws become relatively more wealthy (relative to the ar€rage native) a:rd, as a resu-lt, more sensitive to the higher return to capital which results hom irnmigration. In our para.:netrization, if iaequality in the initial distribution of capital is low enough, a majority of natives prefer a high level of immigration to zero irrmigration.
International capital movements can also hale a significant impact on an economy's openr:ess to immigrantsbr pa,rticular, the more mobile is intemational capital, the less likely is it that natil€s will be opposed to iumigation-This is because, with a constart retums to scale techaology, equa.l proportions of capital and labor can be imported, leaving the retrrns to labor and capital unchanged. We show that, in fact, in a world of perfect physical capital mobilitg natiws a.re indifferent with respect to the level of iynrni$ation.
Increased capital mobility also tends to result in a lorer tax rate on income, and this rate approaches zem as we approach a state with perfect capital mobility.
The results here also show why it is iuappropriate to merely study the effect of immigration merely by alelyzing the impact on wages or elen incomes. In a number of our experiments, natives o<perience rising incomes in some periods as a result of immigration, but a,re aonetheless worse off in terms of lifetime utility. This is because the changes in factor prices caused by immigration influence the savings decisions of trati!€s in ways which lead these natives to re.allocate resources from earlier to later periods. Iucomes in Later periods may be higher as result, but the agents are making trade.offs which they rould not in the absence of immigration.
The model qlso sheds some light on other factors which influence native residelts' desire for increased inmi$ation, including the wealth levels of immigrants, their enfranchisement to vote ouce admitted, and the extent to which they can be denied subsequent benefiis, and 1'et still be unde to pay taxes. It should be clea.r from the previous e:<pression that the agent will then choose tbe tax rete 0 to maximize the term (1 -0) ra3 + T. Note that this implies that an agent's preferred tax rate is independent of his or her level of income- Difier€ntiation of this ecrpression reveals that it is concave and maximized when d : 0.
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The remai:rder of the result follows ftom the fact that with 0:0, the condition Br2: B4 = I then otr' taias, so that K2/.L : h/L : (aBA)\/(r--) independent of .L. As a result, ru2 : r'3 : (1a) A(aBA)'/11-"' , also independent of tr. Since taxes and tra,nsfers are zero for any M, a,ud factor prices ale independmt of M, natives' opportunity sets and equilibrium utility levels are independent of M as well-I 6.2 Determination of the tax rate in a special case
In the special case where there is no foreign capital, and agents have only capital income in the final petiod, it is possible to derive a simple closed-form solution for agents' prefered ta). rates. In this section of the appendix, we preseat that solution, which is usefr:I for ga,rnering some htuition regarding the relationship between the eqfibrium tax rate and median and average second-period income.
Suppose that, then, there is no foreign capital--equivalently, that ) : loo and Kf : 0----and that third-period productior possibilities a.re giren by I'(K) : AK, srt that the equilibrium after-tax return to saving is (1d) A. Consider an a€eut----€ither a native or immigrant-who begins period two with income equal to 99. Giren values for the tax rate 0 and transfer payment ?, the problem faced by such an agmt is md {Iog (yzsg) + f log l(1 -0) As3 + rl} .
It is straightforwerd to veri{y that the optimal choice of savings is given by (18) ",:+ (o*-6_J-r-1^)
By aggregating this expression across all agents, and using the fact that the lumpsum transfer (r) equals the tax rate times the amount of per-capita capital income, it can be shown that By substituting this expression, together with the equations determining optimal consumption and saving decisions, back into the utility fi.rnction (18) , we then get an indirect utility function that describes preferences over these two periods, arld this can be written as follows:
where 4 : -(1 + B) log (1 + B) + plog (BA).Writteu in this manner, it becomes clea.r that a"n irdividual's indirect utility depends not or y on the parameters 0 a.nd A, but also on his 'rncome rcIatiae to the awrfl,ge.
The reasou for this is clear: the agent's resulting transfer payment depends on the a\,€rage lerel of income.
It is straightforwa.rd to verify that this expression is difiermtiable in d, a.nd is decreasing in d when Azf ,z > 7-i.e., when the agent is richer than arerage. The preferred tax rate of any agent with U2 > 92 b alwavs d : 0.
For agents with gr2/!2 < 1, one ca.nlerify that ro is strictly concar,e in d on (0,1). Concavity is easier to see if the two last terms involving d a,re written out as r . / \'r (1 + B) Ios | 1t + f) I + 0B ( | -I ) | -(r + irt t"s 0 + B -0r)+ ploe (1d), L lz \ !z/l which is the sum of three strictly concave firnctions.
Hence a poorer-than-average egent v/ho vrishes to calculate his or her most preferred m,lue of 0 subj€ct to the constraint d € [0, 1], could perform this calculation by merely takiag the derirative of w (0iy2/92), and setting it equal to zero. This yields a quadratic expression and after some tedious algebra it can be shown that the most preferred tax rate of ar agent wil}i U2ly2 = z < 1 is given try r et : ff-t + 28 (t -;I--'F +EF4 Some properties of 9. (z) a.re worth noting. Firsi, d* (z) is decreasing iu z: the relati.r.ely poorer is an agent, the higher is his or her preferred ta>c rate (and tra,nsfer). ALso, lim,-1 d. (z) : 0, so there is no discontinuity in the preferred tax rates as !€ move from the relatively wealthy-those agents with z ) 1, whose preferred tax rate is zero-to the relatirely poor. While 0* (z) la.ries monotonically with z, it's dependence on the time-preference paxameter B is more complex. Finally, as is shovrn in Dolmas and Hufiman [10] , for sufficiently small r.alues of z, 0'(z) may be on the 'wrong' side of the economy's Laffer cune-i.e., for small z,0* (z) may be higher than the value of d which maximizes total tax revenue. 
